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I INTRODUCTION 
 
The failure of the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun2 was not only a 
setback for the Doha Round, but also for the World Trade Organization’s 
efforts to enhance international trade as means to growth and development. 
The group of developing countries led by Brazil, China, India and South Africa, 
known as G-22, made the first step towards a new balance in the multilateral 
trading system. Agriculture was considered a key issue if the new Round was 
meant to succeed.  
It will certainly take time and a great deal of political will to get countries 
back to the negotiating table, but the benefits will outweigh the costs. 
Substantial poverty reduction in the world will be achieved by tackling 
agricultural protection. Poor countries mainly produce agricultural products 
and intensive labor products such as textiles usually facing protective – 
developed markets. Subsidies in the OECD account for more than US$ 
300,000 million targeted at agricultural products originatingin developing 
countries. Annual subsidies at the OECD are equivalent to six times the direct 
economic aid those countries provide for the poor countries.3 Developing 
countries are responsible for seriously committing themselves and reducing 
agricultural barriers – tariff and non- tariff – in order to facilitate trade 
liberalization towards an equity free trade world.    
Anti-dumping4 laws and its enforcement continue to be a major problem 
when it comes to international trade relationships as they turn into non-tariff 
barriers.5 Even when the WTO system provides guidelines and some discipline 
to AD laws, it fails to prevent their abuse by certain country members. 
Therefore, AD laws remain an important issue, not only at the multilateral 
level, but alsoat the bilateral trade level.6 
Argentina and the US have a conflicting trade agenda. Agricultural products 
are at the centre of disputes because Argentina is a very competitive country 
and the US heavily protects its domestic industries.7 In one of the most recent 
cases brought against Argentine exports, Argentine beekeepers faced the 
powerful and well organized American Honey industry. In spite of a worldwide 
                                                 
2 Mexico, September 2003 
3 Alieto A. Guadagni, Executive Director at the World Bank,  World Trade Liberalization and the Millennium 
Development Goals,  Conference at the Colegio de España, Paris, France (September 2003) 
4 Hereinafter AD 
5 We will not address subsidies and countervailing duties (CVD) but most of the critics of AD laws apply to 
subsidies and CVD 
6 Even when we advocate for a successful multilateral trade negotiations we are completely aware of the 
risks of stagnation in the multilateral process. The US is willing to pursuit bilateral o regional trade 
agreements instead. Robert Zoellick made it perfectly clear when he argued that while WTO country 
members analyze the future, the US would not wait; and it would pursuit free trade with countries willing 
to do things. See article in La Nacion, Argentine newspaper, September 24th, 2003; available at: 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar (last visited 9/24/03) 
7 Some of the agricultural products are: sugar, cheese, peanuts, oranges, lemon, honey, etc.  
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recognition of the Argentinean honey industry’s competitiveness, steep 
antidumping duties were imposed against honey from Argentina by the US 
Department of Commerce on December 10th, 2001.8 
This paper will focus on the Anti-dumping honey case between Argentina and 
the US, highlighting some trade and development aspects of those measures 
against Argentina as well as problems with the law enforcement - mainly at 
the US Department of Commerce level.9 General conclusions will be drawn 
from the honey case to argue that the US has abused its AD laws and that 
they lack economic and political sense. 
For a better understanding, this paper is divided as follows: Part II contains a 
general overview on international trade, development and antidumping laws; 
Part III is dedicated to the US-ARGENTINA AD honey- dispute and comments 
on trade and legal aspects of the case; Part IV addresses the impacts of the 
antidumping measures of the US-ARGENTINA honey case; Part V assesses the 
US antidumping law considering the: (i) Antidumping law and its 
administration by the Federal Government; (ii) main flaws in AD law 
enforcement; (iii) dumping margin calculation, methodology, the ‘facts 
available’ standard, the extent and form of requested information by the 
administrative agencies to foreign companies and dumping vs. price 
discrimination; Part VI includes few recommendations to improve the 
Antidumping law enforcement; and the conclusion is in Part VII. 
 
II GENERAL OVERVIEW ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, DEVELOPMENT 
AND ANTIDUMPING LAWS 
Broadly defined, antidumping is international price discrimination. It happens 
when an exporter sells merchandise in the importing country at a price 
significantly below that at which it sells like merchandise in its home country. 
A stricter definition states that antidumping occurs when the exporter sells its 
merchandise in the importing country at a price below its costs of production. 
For the practice to be punished imports must cause or threaten to cause 
material injury to an established industry in the importing country or retard 
the establishment of a domestic industry.10 The importing country may impose 
an antidumping duty on the dumped merchandise in the form of a dumping 
margin.11 
                                                 
8 Julio J. Nogues, US Contingent Protection against Honey Imports: Development Aspects and the Doha 
Round, revised draft, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3088, June 2003, p.1, available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org (last visited September 18th, 2003. 
9 Even when the International Trade Commission has an important role in the process – to determine the 
existence of injury to domestic industries caused by exports – most troublesome aspects of enforcement 
are at the DOC level. 
10 Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GW J. Int’l L. & Econ. 1,  4,9 (1995) 
11 The dumping margin is the difference between the prices for the merchandise in the exporter’s home 
market and the importer country. 
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The underlying philosophy of AD policy has been supported by arguments 
that AD laws are: (i) “vital to the maintenance of fair trade because they deter 
and offset the value of predatory dumping and subsidization in the US market 
by foreign governments or exporters”; 12 (ii) useful as a bargaining chip to 
countries with trade barriers to the American products; (iii) useful to stop 
American job losses due to foreign – cheaper – imports; etc.  
However, the evidence does not to support these arguments. As it will be 
discussed later in this paper, the predatory argument is a weak one, and even 
weaker at the international level, and the methodology for the calculation of 
dumping margin is inaccurate and in many aspects divorced from basic 
accounting practices.  Because of these inaccuracies and the idiosyncrasies of 
the laws, competitive companies are often found guilty even when they were 
not dumping in the US market.   
With regard to the use of AD laws as a bargaining chip, evidence suggests 
that they have not been an effective dissuasive tool so far.  To the contrary, 
empirical evidence demonstrates that the traditional users – such as the US, 
Australia, the EU and New Zealand-, are facing a growing group of new users 
– namely South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina.. “As the number of users of 
AD cases filed annually grow, it is increasingly difficult to identify the motives 
of the users of AD and to argue that increased usage signals merely an 
increase in unfair trade”.13 Moreover, an analytical study including AD cases 
filed to the GATT/WTO during the 80’s and 90’s, rejects the notion that the 
rise in AD activity can be solely explained by an increase in unfair trade.  
In fact, strategic motives are significant in the explanation for the upward 
trend in the use of AD laws .14 Specifically, three-quarters of all AD filings 
patterns for the 1980 – 1998’s period are consistent with the ‘club effect’ and 
with ‘retaliation motives’. Moreover for traditional users both economic and 
strategic motives are important but for the new users strategic motives are 
more important than the economic ones.15  
Actually, antidumping is the most prevalent instrument for imposing new 
import restrictions. In the 1980’s AD laws were used by developed countries; 
however after WTO agreements came into force in 1995, developing countries 
                                                 
12 Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws,  13 NW. J. Int’l L.& Bus. 491, 24 (Spring 
1993) 
13 Thomas J. Prusa – Susan Skeath, The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings, Working 
paper 8424, National Bureau of Economic Research,  p. 1 (August 2001) Available at: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8424  
14 Id. Strategic motives such as being part of the ’club’(the country has previously used AD protection) 
and  ‘retaliation’(referred to a country filing AD specifically against those countries that had previously 
named it in the past) 
15 Id, p.23. These findings are consistent with evidence found by Bloningen and Bown in Bloningen Bruce 
A., US Antidumping Filings and the threat of Retaliation, Mimeo, University of Oregon (2000) and Bown, 
Chad P., Antidumping in the US: The Channels of Foreign Retaliatory Threats, Mimeo, Brandeis University 
(2001) respectively.  
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have been frequently using them.16 Furthermore, per dollars of imports, ten 
developing countries have initiated at least five times more AD cases than the 
US, historically one of the most frequent users. When comparing countries, 
transition economies are the ones with the highest intensity of AD cases 
against them while developed economies the least intensity. “As compared to 
developed economy exporters, developing economy exporters are almost 
three times more intensely targeted”.17 
The AD usage has been under great criticism from both economic and legal 
points of view.  In a significant number of AD cases, the actual problem is a 
loss of comparative advantage and economists generally agree that - except 
for predation - dumping is basically harmless for the importing country. 
Moreover “consumers in the importer country benefit from the lower price of 
imported goods. Empirical evidence suggests that these gains outweigh the 
costs to producers in the importing country, measured by reduced profits and 
to their employees in terms of reduced employment”.18  
Many scholars advocate for a repeal of AD laws, asserting that the laws are 
unnecessary:  injury to an industry caused by imports can be better addressed 
by safeguard or escape laws; AD laws create perverse incentives for the 
exporters and they have a chilling effect on competition.19 
In addition, there is strong evidence of abuse in the law enforcement and 
inconsistency with the rationale of antitrust law and economic theory.20 
Specifically a biased administrative methodology usually finds dumping when 
a fair accounting even of pricing below cost would not and most of the import 
sales allegedly unfair under AD rules would have never been questioned under 
competition law if the case involved a domestic company selling in the 
domestic market.21 In other words, most of cases would have failed the most 
                                                 
16 Developing countries since the Ururguay Round (1995-99) initiated 559 cases, developed countries 463 
and even transition economies entered cases: Poland, Czech Republic and Slovenia. See,  J. Michael 
Finger, Francis Ng and Sonam Wangchuk, Antidumping as Safeguard Policy, December 2001, available 
at:http://www.worldbank.org (last visited September 14th, 2003)    
17 Id., p.6 – Underlined is mine. 
18 Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law,  29 GW J. Int’l L. & Econ. 1, p 4,  (1995) 
19 When an AD case is filed, customers and importers face uncertainty on possible liability and importers 
who might be harmed by dumping penalties hesitate to do business with a foreign supplier under 
investigation. Not to mention the additional obstacle posed by the lack of due process and few chances to 
successfully counter argue the dumping charges.  
20 AD policy triggers incentive for foreign producers to raise the prices to lower the probability of being hit 
by AD action and allows domestic producers to increase their prices. It also result in efficiency losses since 
investigated companies must shift their resources from productive activities to defensive, asset protecting 
activities. For detailed explanation  See, Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws,  13 
NW. J. Int’l L.& Bus. 491 (Spring 1993)  pp 20-24, available at Lexis Nexis (last visited August 10th, 2003) 
21 Particularly interesting is the predatory pricing (pricing below costs of production) argument since much 
of the theory upon which AD policy is built takes for granted that predatory pricing exists and is 
widespread. First of all low prices benefit consumers and encourage competition. Secondly, companies 
selling below costs of production lose money in every sale and help create new low cost competitors. 
Unless there is evidence of the company’s ability to afford selling at low prices, gain market share, drive 
out competitors to raise prices once the competitors are out of the market (recoup), low prices benefit 
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rigorous standards of evidence applicable under the antitrust law. Moreover, 
there is evidence that constructed cost methodology overstates profits rates, 
that data on selling below costs is based on questionable measures of costs 
and when accurate data is available there is no proof of same low prices 
available in the home markets.  
All these findings support the statement that the Uruguay Round Agreement 
did not change the nature of the AD practice. Even when the WTO Agreement 
set out some guidelines to country members and AD is permitted not a 
mandatory practice, the abuses of these laws make neither economic nor 
political sense.22 Specifically, the text of post Uruguay Round AD law is 
ambiguous, and pays no attention to the cost structure of petitioners and 
respondents. It has been acknowledged that petitioners in an AD case have 
numerous opportunities to manipulate a dumping margin calculation to obtain 
the maximum margin, that the injury provisions allow petitioners to 
successfully claim that injury was caused by dumped imported merchandise, 
and that revocation of an AD order is difficult to obtain.23 
The Doha Round and its Development Agenda should be the appropriate 
forum to discuss and - if not abandon – the introduction of amendments to AD 
laws aimed at significantly reducing the discretionary practices of the country 
members when enforcing the AD rules as well as to make them consistent 
with the economic theory.  
This step will be a good starting point to enhance a freer trade multilateral 
system consistent with a Development – Pro-Poor - Agenda. There is sufficient 
cross – country evidence that trade liberalization and openness to trade 
increases the growth rate of income and output. Moreover some studies 
suggest that ‘trade does seem to create, even sustain higher growth’.24 Last 
but not least, there is a relevant link between trade, growth and the poor.   
‘Trade liberalization can be expected to help the poor overall given the positive 
association between openness and growth’.25 
The Doha Round and its promise for development are at stake so far. Unless 
trade barriers in the agricultural sector are slashed substantial reduction in 
global poverty will not be achieved.26 The explanation is pretty 
straightforward: most of the world’s poor work in agriculture, 70% of the 
world’s poor live in rural areas and earn their income from agriculture and 
most of the world’s protection is aimed at agriculture which is among the most 
                                                                                                                                                              
competition. Moreover, “as long as trade barriers are non-existent, it is impossible to drive out all 
competitors and capture the market”, For details See: Robert W. McGee, op.cit.  
22 Economically they harm consumers and import and job related industries. From a public policy point of 
view they are inappropriate as they just benefit small powerful group of interest. 
23 Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law,  29 GW J. Int’l L. & Econ. 1, p 19 and subseq  (1995) 
24 Bernard Hoekman, Constantin Michalopoulos, Maurice Schiff and David Tarr, Trade Policy, p.2, available 
at: http://www.worldbank.org (last visited August 14th, 2003)  
25 Id. 
26 Other crucial issues to development outcomes are: labor-intensive manufactures; services; trade 
facilitation, and special treatment for developing countries.  
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distorted sectors in international trade. “Reducing protection in agriculture 
alone would produce roughly two-thirds of the gains from full global 
liberalization of all merchandise trade27…   
Protection measures include: subsidies, tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The 
abuse of AD laws is clearly a non-tariff barrier in all the economy sectors 
including the agriculture sector which - by the way - is one competitive area 
for various developing countries.  
In fact, developing countries not only are highly competitive in their 
agricultural sector but also they do not dump their products posing a challenge 
to protected industries in developed countries; as is the case with Argentina. 
Because the real concern with dumping is the protection of domestic industry 
from international competition28 AD laws turn into the perfect tool to drive 
efficient exporters out of the developed markets. 
To set an example, the U.S. is one of the world’s leading sources of dumped 
agricultural commodities such as: wheat, corn (maize), soybean, rice and 
cotton. Studies show that the levels of dumping hover around 40% for wheat, 
between 25% and 30% for corn (maize), 30% for soybeans, 20% for rice and 
- in 2001 - 57% for cotton. In other words, this means that wheat is sold 40% 
less than it costs to produce and cotton 57% less!29  
There is no doubt that developing countries are not likely to succeed in their 
efforts to compete in the world markets if all these restraints stay in place.  
It is time for  developed countries to take the leadership and move forward 
on the international trade agenda. As it has correctly been pointed out: 
“Despite the fact that protection, tariff peaks and antidumping measures 
shield powerful lobbies, rich country leadership in reducing this protection is a 
prerequisite for a pro-poor development outcome”.30 
Reality –however- seems to go the opposite way. The U.S. – Argentina 
honey case is a valid example. 
 
III THE US-ARGENTINA HONEY CASE31  
III. 1. TRADE ASPECTS OF THE CASE 
III. 1. a) Argentine honey and global markets. 
                                                 
27 Keep in mind that protection facing developing country exporters in agriculture is 4 to 7 times higher 
than in manufactures in the North and 2 to 3 times higher in developing countries. For details see, GEP, 
note 7. Underlined is mine. 
28 Id. 
29 Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Unites States Dumping on Agricultural Markets, pp 2-3; 
available at: http://www.iatp.org (last visited September, 2nd, 2003) 
30 Id. 
31 As mentioned before honey imports from Argentina were imposed antidumping duties ranging from 
32.6% t o183.8%. A countervailing duty was also imposed accounting for 5.9% (due to the Argentinean 
reimbursement tax program). We will not address the issue of CVD in this paper..  
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Argentina holds one of the leading positions in the honey production 
industry.  The Latin American country had been considered as the world’s 
largest exporter as far as back in 1974. Historically, Argentina has been a 
quality supplier due partly because of its experience in the European and 
Japanese honey markets.32  
For the year 2000, Argentina was the major exporting country – 93,000 
tons- among the leaders; namely Canada, China, Germany, Mexico and the 
US.33 Its international competitiveness has been acknowledged by several 
studies and statistical data.34 Argentina accounted for 14% of honey supply in 
the international market in 1990 and increased its exports up to 24% of the 
world market in 2000. This increase is higher than China’s35 for the same 
period, as Chinese exports only increased 17%. 36 Moreover, in 2002 – in the 
first part of the year - the tonnage exported by Argentina surpassed that of 
China by 74%.37 
Argentine honey exports growth accelerated from 1996.  According to one 
expert, it can not be exclusively explained by the 1995 AD measure imposed 
by the US on the Chinese exports, but also to the competitiveness of the 
industry.38   
On the other hand, the US has become more dependent on imports, despite 
Government supported programs being in place for decades, in addition to AD 
measures against China.  
According to FAO statistics, the average import- production ratio was 41% 
during 1989-1991 and for 1998-2000 period that figure went up to 80%. The 
increase occurred against a stagnant output. In terms of production 
quantities, for the 1989-1991 period, production was 90,000 tons while in 
1998-2000 production was 96,423 (7% increase). “The US stagnation 
occurred in spite of subsidies and protectionist policies while Argentina’ growth 
happened quite naturally”.39 
In terms of quality, differences in natural comparative advantage can explain 
the relative trade performance between the US and Argentina: the overall 
score for Argentina is 9.0 and for the US is 4.5, taking into consideration 
taste, color, drums, purity and crystallization.40 According to US importers, 
Argentine honey is of a very high quality and some packers prefer it to 
                                                 
32 Alberta, Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, Competition for World Honey Markets, Alberta, 
Canada, April, 2001, p.51, available at: http:// www.agric.gov.ab.ca (last visited October 8th, 2003) 
Hereinafter, Alberta Study 
33 Supra note 7,  p.3 
34 See FAO data base 
35 China was the most important world exporter in 1990-2000 accounting for one third of world exports. 
36 Supra note 7  pp2-3 
37 Id. 
38 For details see, Julio Nogues, op.cit.  
39 Supra note 7,  p.5 
40 Supra note 7,  p.6  
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domestic honey as it is clearer.41 In conclusion, Argentina is cost competitive, 
produces good quality honey and markets its product very well. 
 
III 1. b) The US honey industry. 
Honey production is a declining industry in the US and has enjoyed 
governmental protection for over 50 years. Protection has taken many forms, 
including loan programs, and guaranteed purchase programs.  These 
programs have introduced great market instability because the main goal of 
the programs was to diminish risks to producers by eliminating the risks so 
that they could sell their product even when prices were declining. The 1995 
Farm Bill, the 2002 Farm Bill and the Agriculture Appropriation Act (2001) 
contain protection measures to support American honey producers at the 
expense of American consumers and jobs in import – related businesses. The 
Agriculture Appropriation Act established an implicit subsidy, at the rate of 
25%, at the time of the program’s introduction.  
In addition to the aforementioned statutory protection, in 1994, the 
American Beekeeping Federation (ABF) and the American Honey Producers 
Association (AHPA) requested an investigation against China’s imports alleging 
dumping practices. After a preliminary affirmative injury determination, China 
and the US concluded an ‘agreement’ and the investigation was suspended. As 
a consequence, China restricted its exports to the US market to a maximum of 
20,000 tons of honey per year. A quick look at statistical data from the 
previous three years supports the statement that the agreement meant 30% 
less Chinese honey exports to the US. The five - year agreement expired on 
August 1st, 2000. In September 2000, the industry requested another 
antidumping investigation against China and Argentina42 .43 At that time 
Argentina and China’s exports accounted for 79% of US honey imports.44 
 
III  2. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE 
III 2 a) Background: 
Following the domestic industry request, the AD investigation against honey 
from Argentina was initiated.45 On May 11, 2001 the DOC issued the 
Preliminary Determination of sales at less than fair value against the Argentine 
exports.46 days after the publication of the preliminary determination in the 
                                                 
41 Larry Rother, US and Argentina Fight over Honey, New York Times, March 5, 2002 available at 
www.globalpolicy.org (last visited October 9th, 2003) 
42 As mentioned, a subsidy investigation of the Argentine product was also requested. 
43 For a historical overview see, Julio Nogues, op. cit,  pp 7-10 
44 Data available at http://www.beekeeping.com  
45 The applicable and cited Statutes and Regulations are those provisions in the Tariff Act of 1930 - with 
amendments effective January 1, 1995- and regulations codified at 19 CFR part 351 (2000) 
46 See, Notice of Preliminary Determination o Sales at less than Fair Value: Honey from Argentina, 66 FR 
24108 (May 11, 2001) 
II Congreso en Relaciones Internacionales del IRI  
11 y 12 de noviembre de 2004 - La Plata, Argentina 
Federal Register.47  The period of investigation (POI) was July 1, 1999 through 
June 30, 2000 covering three main honey exporters: Radix S.R.L. (Radix), 
Asociacion de Cooperativas Argentinas (ACA) and ConAgra Argentina48 and 12 
randomly selected beekeepers unaffiliated with the exporters. 
The products covered by the investigation were: natural honey, artificial 
honey containing more than 50% natural honey by weight, preparations of 
natural honey containing more than 50% natural honey by weight and 
flavored honey.49  The subject merchandise included all colors and grades of 
honey whether in liquid, creamed, comb, cut comb or chunk form and whether 
packed for retail or in bulk form. 
After the Department of Commerce (DOC)50 issued the preliminary 
determination, the petitioners, ACA and Radix51 submitted case briefs. 
Rebuttals from all the parties were also submitted to the DOC for 
consideration, and a public hearing was held on August 28, 2001. Specifically 
on June 11, 2001 and June 18, 2001 respondents ACA and Radix submitted 
additional factual information regarding the cost of production of honey in 
Argentina, which was disputed by the petitioners. The DOC verified responses 
submitted by ACA and Radix at their respective headquarters in Buenos Aires 
during June 2001. On August 24, 2001 a proposed agreement of suspension 
was initialed by the respondents and a representative of the DOC. After 
comments  On November 21, 2001 the DOC issued the Amended Final 
Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value on Honey from Argentina.52 
 
III 2 b) Main issues disputed at the DOC 
As in most of the antidumping investigations, the DOC’s assessment of the 
dumping margin is troublesome, particularly when it comes to estimating the 
costs of production (COP). The main issues in this case were: (i) the use of 
facts available and adverse facts standards; (ii) the calculation of COP; (iii) 
treatment of the middlemen reseller expenses; (iv)  calculation of the general 
and administrative (G&A) and indirect expenses; (v) calculation of the testing 
expenses; (vi) accounting for differences in physical characteristics in 
merchandise; (vii) the German warranty expenses; (viii) the inventory 
                                                 
47 66 FR 30143 (June 6th, 2001) 
48 Others were: Honey Max SA, Nexco SA, Cia Europea Americana SA, Foodway SA, Cia Inversora Platense 
SA, Miel Ar, Miel Gibbons and Times SA. 
49 Memorandum to Faryar Shirzad Assistant Secretary from Joseph A. Spetrini Deputy Assistant Secretary 
AD/CVD Enforcement Group III; 2001 WL 1172645 (ITA).   Pages are not available for the public version 
of the document. Hereinafter, Memorandum 
50 Hereinafter DOC 
51 Radix was allowed to re-enter the investigation on June 12, 2001 after having withdrawn on May 1, 
2001 
52 66 FR 58434 
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carrying costs; and (ix) the level of trade (LOT) adjustment.53 Following is a 
more detailed discussion of each issue. 
The use of facts available and adverse facts available54 
Petitioners requested the DOC to draw an adverse inference against 
respondents regarding the COP data used in the calculation of dumping 
margin alleging that respondents: (i) willfully withheld cost information 
demanded from the Agency; (ii) untimely filed requested information, and (iii) 
submitted unreliable information that was prepared at the request of the 
Argentine Secretary of Agriculture. Respondents rebutted those allegations. 
ACA contended that they fully cooperated with the DOC by responding within 
the applicable deadlines to the Agency’s numerous requests and by facilitating 
the verification process in Buenos Aires.55 Moreover, ACA argued that even 
when ACA had no control over the beekeepers and could not oblige them to 
keep verifiable records and respond to the DOC, ACA assisted the DOC’s 
attempts to acquire COP information from the selected beekeepers. In other 
words, ACA stated that it had acted to the best of its ability, as required by 
law. The DOC acknowledged that independent beekeepers are members of a 
highly fragmented industry and that exporters have no control over them, and 
that ACA and Radix fully participated in the investigation.56 This was crucial to 
the respondents in order to be exempted from the application of an adverse 
facts inference.  Respondents argued that it was impossible to gather reliable, 
verifiable and consistent information from the twelve unaffiliated 
beekeepers.57 However, adverse facts were attributed to ConAgra pursuant to 
                                                 
53 Other issue was the tax reimbursement. We will not discuss it since it is part of the CVD outside the 
scope of this paper. 
54 Section 776 (a) of the Trade Act 1930 provides that: “if any interested party or any other person—(A) 
withholds information that has been requested by the administering authority, (B) fails to provide such 
information by the deadlines for the submission of the information or in the form and manner requested, 
subject to subsections (c) (1) ands (e) section 782, (C) significantly impedes a proceeding under this title, 
or (D) provides such information but the information can not be verified as provided in section 782 (i), the 
administering authority and the Commission shall, subject to section 782 (d), use the facts otherwise 
available in reaching the applicable determination under this title”. The statute also requires that certain 
conditions be met before the Department may resort to the facts otherwise available. Where the 
Department determines that a response to a request for information does not comply with the request, 
section 782 (d) of the Act provides that the Department will so inform the party submitting the response 
and will, to the extent practicable, provide that party the opportunity to remedy or explain the deficiency. 
If the party fails to remedy the deficiency within the applicable time limits, the Department may, subject 
to section 782 (e) of the Act disregard all or part of the original and subsequent responses, as 
appropriate. Section 782 (e) of the Act provides that the Department “shall not decline to consider 
information that is submitted by an interested party and is necessary to the determination but does not 
meet all the appropriate requirements established by the administering authority” if the information is 
timely, can be verified, is no so incomplete that can not be used and if the interested party acted to the 
best of its ability in providing the information. Where all these conditions are met, and the Department 
can use the information without undue difficulties, the statute requires it to do so. 
55 Over 200 pages in responses 
56 2001 WL 1172645 (ITA); A- 357-812 Investigation, Public Document, Comment 1, October 4,2001 
57 See, Honey from Argentina, Investigation No.a-357-812, Reply brief on behalf of Asociacion de 
Cooperativas Argentinas, p. 1, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickerung, August 14, 2001. Respondent alleges that 
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section 776 (b) of the Act, as the record did not reflect cooperation by that 
particular respondent. 
 
(ii) The calculation of COP 
Following the statutory proceedings, the DOC first attempted to estimate 
costs by obtaining information directly from honey producers. The main 
obstacle to doing this in the instant case was locating the producers, because 
in Argentina honey producers are “independent, family – business, located in 
inaccessible areas of the country”.58  
Not surprisingly, many of the producers were difficult to locate. The DOC, 
however, attempted to establish a sample of twelve beekeepers by sending its 
sophisticated, detailed questionnaire in English to the beekeepers, requiring 
specific information about each business and sales of honey.  It must be noted 
that beekeepers, for the most part, are ordinary people who live in the rural 
areas of Argentina and do not have foreign language skills or accounting 
knowledge.59 Needless to say, the DOC’s attempt to gather beekeeper COP 
data failed.  
Unable to obtain information directly from the beekeepers to estimate the 
COP, the DOC, used its discretionary powers to reconstruct costs and assess a 
dumping margin While the DOC could have used market-oriented approaches 
such as export prices to markets other than the US – specifically to Germany, 
where Argentina exports heavily, 60 
The DOC used instead an inaccurate methodology and based its numbers on 
an unreliable study of honey production to come up with a constructed value 
(CV) of the subject merchandise. The DOC based its COP estimations on a 
“second rate journal called Gestión Apicola that had been print for a brief 
number of months before the petition was filed and has by now gone out of 
print”.61 Nonetheless, that journal was not only  characterized as ‘best 
available evidence’ by the DOC, but also the only piece of evidence that the 
DOC used. The Agency characterized the studies published by the Journal as 
‘independent’ evidence, prepared by an independent author; and not in 
anticipation or response to an AD investigation.   
However; it is fairly obvious that the studies presented in Gestion Apicola 
had been conducted for the Petitioner’s purposes: the Journal’s estimations 
presented serious accounting flaws aimed at finding dumping margin.  This 
                                                                                                                                                              
adverse facts applied to ACA because of unaffiliated beekeepers lack of compliance with questionnaires, 
would have been perverse. 
58 Honey from Argentina, Investigation No.a-357-812, Case brief on Behalf of Asociacion Cooperativas 
Argentinas, Public Version, p. 1, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (August 27, 2001) Hereinafter Case Brief ACA 
59 The complexity of questionnaires and the lack of understanding to the beekeepers that were able to 
locate was confirmed by the ACA’s legal defense.  
60 See Julio Nogues op cit. 
61 Supra note 7,  p.12. 
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was the evidence that the DOC relied on to estimate COP. This decision raises 
serious concerns about the DOC’s impartiality during AD investigations for the 
following reasons. 
First, there was a change in the accounting methodology used in the cost 
studies done by Gestión Apícola in 1997, and the studies prepared and 
published in 1999. The 1997 studies applied a standard by-product calculation 
to beekeeper nuclei production.62 . Revenue from nuclei was subtracted from 
total cost and the honey cost of production was calculated by dividing the 
remaining costs by kilograms of honey produced.63 Suddenly, and without any 
explanation, a new calculation methodology was applied to the studies. The 
main consequence of this new claculation was to exclude the nuclei and not 
consider them at all. This new calculation suspiciously coincided with the 
petitioner’s interest.  
The DOC accepted estimates of costs published in the magazine, such as 
US$ 0.58 dollars per lb, in September 1999. An independent Canadian study 
had estimated the same costs at US$ 0.47 dollars.  But there was no attempt 
on behalf of the Agency to look at any other evidence except the Journal with 
the higher cost estimates.   Data presented in the studies published in Gestion 
Apicola, invariably led to an increased likelihood of finding a dumping margin 
because it overstated the costs and improperly assessed the beekeeping 
practice in Argentina. “Separating the costs of production of honey and other 
products instead of assigning all costs to honey would have reduced the costs 
of production from US$1.36 dollars per kilograms to US$1.04 dollars per 
kilograms or US$0.47 dollars per lb which coincides with the estimate 
presented in the Alberta study (2001, page 57)”.64  Gestion Apicola 
overestimated several times the costs of  wax replacements and feeding costs 
(over estimated by 51%) and the costs of health care of the beehives (over 
estimated by 33%). 65 
Moreover, the DOC by virtue of considering Gestión Apícola an independent 
study worthy  of the facts available standard, relied completely on it – even 
when the studies lacked the logic of modern mathematics. “In the March 1999 
study, for example, revenues of $3,000 from nuclei, $180 from virgin wax and 
$4357 from honey are summed and reported as total income. When 
calculating cost of production, however, the petitioners’ studies appeared to 
disregard the nuclei entirely”.66  
                                                 
62 Explain what a nuclei is 
63 Case Brief ACA, p.3 
64 Supra note 7, p.13 
65 Id 
66 Similar calculation problems occur in each of the studies presented by the petitioners: although 
adjusted cost is $9184 and total honey produced is 5250 kg, the total cost of production is $1.36 per kg. 
There is no explanation in those studies on the departure of the accounting principles. See, Case Brief 
ACA, p.4 
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For the purpose of the final determination and despite the questions raised 
by respondents, the DOC used the Journal and based COP and profit for 
constructed value (CV) on the average of the 1999 studies from Gestión 
Apícola. The Agency stated that a change in the cost allocation methodology 
did not appear unreasonable as the value of the nuclei production changed 
significantly from 1997 to 1999. In its language: “We do not have any reason 
to conclude that the cost provided and the allocation methodologies used in 
the cost studies are not reflective of some producer’s costs in Argentina, or 
the industry in Argentina as a whole”.67  There is no evidence in the public 
record that the DOC at least attempted to develop a logical explanation for the 
calculation problems pointed out in the ACA Case Brief.  In fact, from the 
public record, it can be concluded that those questions remained unanswered. 
The DOC decided on the merits by simply stating that there was no reason to 
doubt that those were not the costs of the Argentine producers. This 
unfortunate lack of legal soundness did not consider the negative economic 
consequences of the ruling on the respondents  
Second, as mentioned before, studies published by Gestión Apícola 
overestimated wax costs by assuming that beekeepers would annually renew 
one third of the wax in each hive and would pay to purchase the full amount 
of that wax. They also overestimated the percentage of queens replaced each 
year by a typical beekeeper. Beekeeping practice in Argentina is to replace 
only one third of the frame wax in the breeding boxes and to renew wax in the 
honey boxes every eight years.68  
It would have been appropriate for the Agency to use its inquisitorial powers 
to find the truth, since it is pretty clear that the accuracy of the information 
was strongly contested. Unfortunately, the DOC rested its decision on the 
failure of the Argentine honey producers to provide the Department with the 
COP information. The DOC insisted on relying on the Gestion Apicola studies 
by merely stating that: “We continue to believe that these studies represent 
the most relevant, contemporaneous, and specific data available on the record 
of this proceeding for purposes of determining the cost of production for 
honey. As the study appears to capture all costs relating to producing honey, 
and appears to allocate these costs to all products produced using a 
reasonable methodology, we have relied on the study as non-adverse facts 
available for the final determination”.69 
 
                                                 
67 2001 WL 1172645 (ITA), October 4,2001 – A 357-812 Investigation, Public Document provided by the 
respondents 
68 The DOC disregarded the affidavit presented by ACA regarding this facts. The agency based its decision 
solely on the circumstance that it was prepared by a government official – therefore assuming bias of the 
Argentine Government and implicitly questioning the good faith of the Foreign Government. Moreover, the 
author of this paper is familiar with the honey production in Argentina and agrees with the respondents in 
the sense that the affidavit reflects what the beekeeping practice in Argentina is. 
69 ACA Case Brief, Comment 2. (Publication page references are not available for this document). 
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(iii)The Middlemen reseller expenses 
There was also a dispute over the middlemen reseller expenses for purposes 
of the COP and CV calculations. According to the Petitioners, the DOC 
preliminary determination underestimated the average COP and CV of 
Argentine honey because it failed to include the selling, general and 
administrative expenses and profits of  ‘middlemen’ resellers.70 They 
contended that the small numbers of exporters in Argentina compared to the 
vast number of honey producers confirmed the exporter’s reliance upon 
middlemen. They argued that the COP and CV calculations therefore should 
reflect all the expenses actually incurred on honey exported to the U.S., 
including the expenses and profits of these brokers.71 On the other hand, 
respondents contended that Petitioner’s position on this issue exaggerated the 
role of the middlemen, which was only to negotiate a sale to the exporter and 
instruct the beekeepers to deliver a certain quantity of honey. The DOC 
included the costs of middlemen as expenses incurred by producers and 
exporters and allocated them in the G&A and selling expenses of ACA and 
Radix when calculating the COP.72 
 
(iv) General and administrative (G&A) and indirect expenses 
Allocation methodology for indirect selling expenses and accountability for 
G&A expenses was also contested. Regarding Radix’s accountability, the DOC 
accepted Radix’s methodology, because Radix had allocated its indirect selling 
expenses to honey and other products in its own accounting records. 
Moreover, the majority of expenses reported were properly verified by the 
DOC. As for ACA, the dispute was over a volume-based methodology used in 
calculating indirect selling expenses. Petitioners argued that the volume- 
based methodology took away from honey and that a value-based 
methodology would result in a more fair match between expenses and sales 
revenue. ACA‘s defended using a volume- based methodology for calculating 
indirect selling expenses because a significant amount of the work performed 
by the export department is volume dependent. The DOC adopted the volume 
based methodology and recalculated - in its final determination - the indirect 
selling expenses merely stating that “ [t]he Department’s normal practice is to 
calculate indirect selling expenses based on a value-based rather than 
volume-based methodology”, without any further explanation.73  
In addition, there was a controversy over the G&A expenses calculation in 
ACA’s records. Petitioners claimed that ACA’s country-wide G&A expenses 
were not included in the DOC preliminary analysis and that it should be done 
based on the respondent’s audited financial statements. ACA argued that the 
                                                 
70 Also referred as brokers and collectors (acopiadores in Spanish) 
71 Memorandum, comment 3. 
72 However no adjustment was made in the Final Determination. 
73 Memorandum, comment 11. 
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DOC in its preliminary determination correctly noted that G&A expenses had 
been included in the total cost calculated by Gestion Apicola. ACA’ s selling 
expenses had been added to the average COP of the five studies published in 
Gestion Apicola. Moreover, the respondent claimed that, as it had 
demonstrated during the verification process, the indirect selling expenses 
included administrative expenses related to sales, namely real estate, 
secretarial support, gas, electricity, telephone and supplies.  
Nonetheless; the DOC’ s position was to agree with petitioner’s 74 It seems 
that the DOC, for the sake of easy margin calculations, decided that “ACA 
begins and ends with its export department”.75 
 
(v)Testing expenses 
As for the testing expenses dispute, the issue was whether to classify them 
as indirect or direct selling expenses in all the markets or just in the German 
market. 76 In spite of evidence that testing expenses were directly related to 
sales to Germany – as a required condition of the German buyers- the DOC 
decided that testing expenses should be considered as indirect selling 
expenses allocated over sales to all markets,  based on the DOC ’s  practice.77  
 
(vi) Differences in physical characteristics in merchandise 
ACA requested a normal value adjustment based on differences in the 
subject merchandise sold in the U.S. and in Germany. Honey which meets the 
German requirements is not an identical product to that sold by ACA to their 
U.S. customers. In other words, German strict sanitary standards make a 
difference in the product and involve additional variable selling costs.78 That 
means that the market value of antibiotic and phenol free honey is, at a 
minimum, $80 per metric ton higher than the market value that is not 
certified antibiotic and phenol free.79  
                                                 
74 ACA’s administrative departments on which G&A calculations were based earned substantial income 
from provision of various services to member cooperatives and others. These earnings and expenses 
associated with such earnings are not recorded in ACA’s financial statement. The income if not offset 
expenses associated with the respondent’s administrative departments, should have been properly 
accounted for in the denominator use to calculate the G&A and interest expense ratios.  
75 For a detailed explanation See, Re: Honey from Argentina Ministerial Errors, Investigation No. A-357-
812, Document submitted to the Honorable Donald Evans, Secretary of Commerce by Wilmer, Cuttler & 
Pickering. (October 22, 2001) 
76 Honey exported to Germany should be tested against antibiotic and phenol. Those expenses and its 
characterization were in dispute. 
77 It seems that the evidence on tested honey -not meeting the German requirements and re sold in the 
US  market- was enough to conclude that ‘ record does not unequivocally demonstrate expense 
associated with this activities’. See Memorandum, Comment 14 
78 Laboratory testing 
79 Memorandum, comment 17 
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The DOC agreed with the petitioner’s position. They ruled that because all 
third country sales were sold at prices below the COP80 they based NV on CV; 
and CV by definition is a construction of the product as sold in the U.S.; 
therefore no adjustment was proper 81 
 
(vii) German warranty expenses 
There was an issue regarding ACA’ s warranty worksheet and its 
interpretation. Basically the petitioners argued that the respondent in its 
calculation of German warranty expenses incorrectly included expenses that 
were not related to returns. ACA contended  that claimed warranty expenses 
were limited to those additional expenses incurred as a direct result of the 
rejection of honey by German customers. The DOC re- calculated ACA’s 
Germany warranty expenses and included only those expenses associated 
with ACA’s original sales to Germany returned to Argentina, and excluded 
freight and movement expenses associated with transporting the resold honey 
to the U.S. 
 
(viii) Inventory carrying costs 
Radix disputed the petitioner’s request to include inventory carrying costs in 
the CV arguing that the petition was an outdated DOC policy. The DOC did not 
include the inventory carrying costs in the final determination since the 
Agency acknowledged that that was not the current DOC practice. 
 
(ix) Level of trade(LOT) 
ACA contended that because all of its customers in Germany are packers and 
all customers in the U.S. are importers, the impact on price comparability can 
not be seen by examining ACA’s prices at different levels of trade (“LOT”) in a 
single market. Respondent argued that they provided important additional 
selling services to the German customers, which are honey packers, and took 
on the functions normally performed by importers in the U.S. market. The 
respondent submitted an affidavit to provide for an adequate proxy for the 
LOT differential and pursuing section 773 (a) (1) (B) of the Trade Act, 
requested for a LOT adjustment. 
One more time the DOC sided with the petitioners because they were not 
convinced – based on record- that the varying degree to which warranty 
                                                 
80 There is no economic rationale on this statement considering that there is over 25,000 beekeepers in 
Argentina, it is a family business, the industry is a highly fragmented one and most of the beekeepers 
have few hives. There is no way for them to sell below cost without being out of business in just few 
months. 
81 The DOC based its ruling on section 773 (a) (6) (C) (ii) of the Statute 
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services had been provided were sufficient to determine the existence of 
different market stages.82  
In conclusion, administrative proceedings and the DOC administration of AD 
laws were intended to benefit the petitioners. In other words, rules and 
practice are neither aimed at seeking  the truth nor toward guaranteeing due 
process. It was almost impossible for respondents to successfully counter act 
the domestic industry’s allegations. 
  
IV) IMPACTS OF THE AD MEASURES 
IV) a) PRICE IMPACTS IN THE US  
As a result of the dumping margin, wholesale prices went up rapidly in the 
U.S. According to U.S. importers, in a few months, the cost of a pound of 
white honey went from US$0.50 dollars a pound to US$0.80 dollars as an 
immediate consequence of the gap in honey availability, due to the 
disappearance of Argentine honey from the market. Needless to say, American 
consumers were directly affected by the protection measure. 
On the other hand, the International Trade Commission (ITC) when 
determining if injury to domestic industry was being caused by ‘dumped and 
subsidized imports’ it considered the: (i) recent behavior of import volumes; 
(ii) effect of imports on domestic prices and; (iii) other factors that might 
account for any injury that is being experienced by the industry. During the 
period under investigation, imports had an important increasing trend: from 
60,000 tons in 1998 to 83,000 ton in 1999, to 90,000 tons in 2000 and 
continued increasing during the first semester (quarter?) of 2001 while the 
ITC was running the investigation. If slow growth in domestic production is 
considered, the participation of imports in apparent consumption increased 
from 28.4% in 1998 to 36.8% in 1999, to 37.7 in 2000.  
The ITC decided to cumulate imports from Argentina and China, therefore 
increasing the probability of finding injury in the domestic industry.83 The 
Agency decided that the effects of imports in domestic prices had a negative 
impact.  
Lower prices from 1995 can be partially explained by Argentina’s presence in 
the international markets as well as by evidence of declining profits and 
problems in repayments of loans by beekeepers. Nonetheless the ITC issued a 
positive determination of domestic injury due to the Argentine honey import.  
However, it must be stressed that the ITC findings are in fact the 
consequence of bad economics such as to consider whether imports are 
having an impact on the fiscal costs of honey supporting programs and normal 
effects of declining industries unable to match international competition.   
                                                 
82 Memorandum, Comment 18 
83Supra note 7, p 17 
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Citing an experienced businessman:  “We really don’t have a clue how we 
are going to meet the requirements of the U.S packing industry over the next 
12 months What we have now is a situation I have never seen before in 27 
years of business, on that in the long run is going to benefit nobody”, Nicholas 
Sargeantson, president of Sunland International, an importer in New Canaan, 
Conn. said.84  
In conclusion, the AD investigation drove out the Argentinean honey from 
the American market – in spite of its quality and better price – provoking price 
increasing and harming consumers as well as import –related jobs and 
business. 
 
IV) b) IMPACTS OF THE AD MEASURES IN ARGENTINA 
There are important trade effects following the AD and CVD investigation and 
the subsequent imposition of duties on Argentine honey. Although there are 
two main causes of disruption to the honey market, namely the imposition of 
duties and findings of antibiotics in Chinese honey in 2002, this paper will 
focus on the former.85 
Devastating effects on Argentina’s honey exports started when the U.S. 
Administration began the AD investigation proceedings. In 2001, U.S. honey 
imports from Argentina declined by 55%. Even when there was an apparent 
market substitution with honey imports from Vietnam, Mexico and Uruguay, 
overall U.S. imports during 2001 were 26% below the 2000 recorded level.86  
There is a direct cause between the AD investigation and declining honey 
imports from Argentina: “starting in May 2001, shortly after the preliminary 
affirmative determination by the DOC and six months in advance of the final 
decision, imports began to crawl down through the zero axis line raising the 
fears of a major collapse of Argentina’s honey industry”.87 This is a typical 
effect of an AD investigation: during the period of investigation imports are 
reduced by roughly half the decrease that might be expected if AD duties 
would have been imposed from the beginning of the investigation.88 
Even when duties imposed on Argentina’s honey benefited other export 
markets – such as Germany – the protective measure and ban on Chinese 
exports created a supply shortage that “led to a process of accelerated 
increases in honey prices around the world.”89  
                                                 
84 Larry Rother, US and Argentina Fight over Honey, New York Times, March 5, 2002 available at 
www.globalpolicy.org (last visited October 9th, 2003)  
85 For an analysis on trade impacts in 2002 following the sanitary induced import ban on China, see Julio 
Nogues, op.cit. 
86 Supra note 7, pp.25-26 citing USITC source. 
87 Id. 
88 Supra note 7, pp 27-28 citing Staiger and Wolak 
89 Supra note 7, p.29 
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There is no doubt that under these circumstances consumers are harmed. It 
is not easy to calculate the trade protective measures against Argentina and 
the price increase isolating China’s ban on imports. However, taking into 
account that in the year 2000, honey consumption in the U.S. was 179,143 
tons and the retail price was $7 per kilo, it was estimated that the extra costs 
that U.S. consumers would pay on account of AD and CV duties was $238 
million dollars.90 
Last but not least at all, there are important negative social impacts of the 
AD measures on Argentina, namely the increasing poverty effects on the 
Argentine honey industry. 91 
As mentioned before, Argentina is the leading exporter of honey, largely 
benefiting from low cost production, plentiful floral sources, reliable and 
internally competitive marketing channels and good honey quality.  
However, at the time of the imposition of AD duties, due to the price levels 
the income of Argentine beekeepers –and even some exporters- had declined 
significantly. “High interest rates and taxation levels exacerbated the 
problem”.92 It was pretty unclear how well producers could survive in low- 
priced markets. Producers with high fixed costs and substantial debt were 
under great financial stress with high interest prevailing. In fact, some 
preliminary reports acknowledged that beekeepers were exiting the market by 
abandoning their hives.93 
The honey industry in Argentina is composed mainly of small producers. 
Most of them own a low number of bee colonies; “only 11% of beekeepers 
maintained over 300 hives and the vast majority of Argentina’s 18,000 
beekeepers appear to approach beekeeping as a sideline affair”.94 Small 
producers have less than 50 beehives95.  
In Argentina, only 3% of producers are big producers while the rest of the 
producers are distributed as follows: 12% own from 350 to 500 beehives; 
75% own between 20 and 350 beehives and 10% own less than 20 
beehives.96 The honey industry in Argentina, according to the Alberta Study, 
provides employment to around 60,000 people, most of them being family 
members. Simple math- calculation indicates that for most Argentine 
producers, honey sales allow an extremely low standard of living: In 1998 
annual net income for honey producer was US$0.30 dollars per kilo. Assuming 
                                                 
90 For details on the assumptions and calculations, See Julio Nogues, op. cit. pp.31-33 
91 The consequence of the American market shut down to the Argentine honey has not only  trade and 
social  related effects but political impact on the bilateral relationship between the US and Argentina. 
Growing Anti-Americanism feelings and an increasing popular demand for results from the alignment to 
the US foreign policy in the 1990’s are the most obvious manifestations of the Argentines’ discontent.  
92 Alberta Study, p.72 
93 Id. 
94 Alberta Study, p.51 
95 Big producers are those who have more than 500 beehives 
96 Supra note 7,  p.31 
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that each beehive produces 35 kilos of honey, a 300 - beehive producer 
makes net US$3,150 dollars or US$300 dollars per month.97 
Argentine honey producers - as in many others parts of the world - make 
their living from honey production.  A free competitive world is instrumental to 
raising their living standards. It seems that the U.S. – one of the biggest 
honey importers – will continue to hit developing countries in spite of their 
fair, competitive agricultural industry.  Moreover, one lesson to be learned 
from the last decade is that: “becoming a successful honey exporter98 is more 
likely to make beekeepers from exporting countries poorer rather than richer. 
In this way an industry that is very close to poor people all over the world and 
that should be fostered and stabilized, is in fact being severely harmed by 
discriminatory trade policies”.99 
 
V. THE US ANTIDUMPING LAW 
V. 1) THE AD LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION  
The AD laws have been part of U.S. law for decades.100 The current law is 
based in the 1979 Act101 with minor modifications.102 The most important 
amendment is that of 1984 that requires injuries to be assessed by 
cumulating imports from competing countries that are being subject to 
investigation.103 This amendment allowed the ITC to cumulate Argentine and 
Chinese honey imports for the purpose of the injury to the domestic industry 
determination. 
The US statutory prohibition of dumping reads as follows:  
“It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting importing any 
articles from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and 
systematically to import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles 
within the United States at a price substantially less than the actual market 
value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of the exportation to the 
                                                 
97 Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Cordoba, Entre Rios and La Pampa, are the most important provinces for honey 
production. 
98 As mentioned before Argentina is extremely export –oriented with production over 93,000 tons and 
consumption only at 5,000 tons. Top exporter in 2000 was the Association of Argentine Coops (ACA), 
followed by Conagra and Honey Max – 24,000 tons, 9,650 tons and 8,950 tons respectively 
99 Supra note 7,p.34 
100 For an historical review of the AD legislation in the USA, See: Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal 
the Antidumping Laws,  13 NW. J. Int’l L.& Bus. 491, 2,3 (Spring 1993) Available at Lexis Nexis (last 
visited August 10th, 2003).  
101 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 incorporated the 1930 Tariff Act’s dumping provisions. It took 
effect January 1, 1980 the same day the GATT Antidumping Code entered into force in the USA. 
102 One important consequence of the AD revision was the government’s decision to shift the 
administration of the AD laws from the Treasury Department to the Commerce Department. It increased 
the imposition of AD penalties on foreign companies. 
103 This amendment allowed the ITC to cumulate Argentine and Chinese honey imports increasing the 
likelihood of finding dumping 
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United States, in the principal markets of the countries of their production, or 
of other foreign countries to which they are commonly exporting after adding 
to such market value or wholesale price, freight, duty, and other charges or 
expenses necessarily incident to the importation and sale thereof in the United 
States: Provided, That such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying 
or injuring an industry in the United Sates, or of preventing the establishment 
of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part 
of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States”.104 
 
Two governmental administrative agencies are in charge of enforcing the AD 
and CV laws as enacted by Congress: International Trade Administration 
(ITA)105, a division of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the 
International Trade Commission (ITC).  Both have different roles. On one 
hand, the DOC determines whether imports are ‘dumped’ into the US 
market106 and also determines the margins of dumping. The DOC focuses on 
individual businesses in order to compute dumping margins unique to those 
situations. Questionnaires are detailed regarding production by individual 
producers or an association’s individual members.107  
On the other hand, the ITC makes one determination based on the effects 
that imports have on the domestic industry as a whole.108 In order to issue an 
affirmative determination, the ITC findings must support the argument that 
imports have materially injured the domestic industry; that imports are 
threatened with material injury or that imports are retarding the 
establishment of domestic industry.109 The ITC usually relies on comparisons 
of indicative or characteristic data to reach its final decision.110 
Normally an AD proceeding involves five stages. The first one includes the 
DOC, which decides whether to start an investigation. This decision is 
contingent on a petition alleging the required elements for implementing an 
AD duty based on information “reasonably available to the petitioner 
supporting the allegations”.111 This stage also includes the petitioner’s 
standing issue.   
                                                 
104 15 U.S.C. 72 (1988) 
105 Hereinafter we will make reference to the DOC. 
106 In the case of Subsidies, it determines whether imports are benefiting from subsidies implemented by 
the importing country’s government. 
107 Steven Thuesen, Sustainable Production Agriculture in the face of Foreign Commodity Dumping: 
Achieving Effective Anti Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations, 77 N. Dakota L. Rev. 453, 2, 
(2001) Available at Lexis Nexis, last visited August 14th, 2003) 
108 ITC does not make determinations regarding specific companies. 
109 19, U.S.C. 1671 d (b) (1), 1673 d (b) (1) 
110 The investigation must be completed in 235 days from the date the petition was filed. Under certain 
circumstances preliminary AD investigation can be extended for 50 more days and the final determination 
for 60 more days. 
111 Steven Thuesen, op. cit, p.3  
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If there is an affirmative preliminary determination by the DOC, the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) makes a preliminary determination on 
whether there is a reasonable indication that domestic industry is being 
materially injured, threatened with material injury or its establishment is being 
retarded.112 This is the second stage of the proceedings. 
The third stage follows an affirmative finding by the ITC. It consists of the “ 
DOC’ s  preliminary determination as to whether there is a reasonable basis to 
believe or suspect that the imported goods are being sold, or are likely to be 
sold, at less than fair market value”.113  Even when final duties will not be 
collected until the dumping investigation is finished the importer will be 
required to post some type of bond to guarantee against possible adverse 
dumping duty determination at the end of the proceedings. 
The fourth stage is conducted within 75 days of the preliminary investigation 
and involves a final determination by the DOC regarding the sale of imported 
goods.  
If final determination is affirmative, the fifth step is for the ITC to make its 
final determination of material injury and finally the DOC issues the AD order. 
If either the DOC or ITC determinations are insufficient to support the 
allegations of the petitioner or findings are negative, the investigation is 
over.114 
The DOC has a decisive role in the AD investigations. It decides whether to 
start the administrative procedure and the standing issue as well as the 
dumping margin. A sufficient petition is to be filed by an interested party; that 
means it must be filed on behalf of an industry that alleges the necessary 
elements of unfair trade coupled with information reasonable available to the 
petitioner. Standing includes analyzing if the domestic industry produces a 
“like product”(like those being imported) as well as if the interested party 
filing the petition represents115 industries that manufacture the “like product” 
in the domestic market.116 However this is a simple petition and no high 
evidence standards to support the petition are required. 
 The ITC has the final word to determine which domestic product or products 
are most like the imported article defined by the DOC. Six factors are 
considered by the ITC in order to determine the ‘like product’: (i) physical 
characteristics and uses; (ii) interchangeability; (iii) channels of distribution; 
(iv) customer and producer perceptions; (v) common manufacturing facilities 
and production employees; and (vi) when appropriate, price.117  There is no 
                                                 
112 The ITC has 45 days from the date of the petition was filed to make the preliminary decision. 
113 Id .Note 113 
114 Id. 
115 Individual petitions must represent at least 25% of the total domestic production of the like product. 
This also applies to petitions filed by associations or organizations. 
116 19, U.S.C. 1677(10) . Like or most similar in characteristics and uses to the article imported and 
subject to investigation.  
117 Steven Thuesen, op. cit, p.5 
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clear definition on what constitutes ‘like product’ and decisions are made on a 
case by case basis, introducing a great deal of uncertainty. 
As for the material injury determination, the ITC must assess whether there 
is ‘a reasonable indication’ that a domestic industry is being or is threatened 
by material injury because of the imports alleged in the petition. The 
reasonable indication standard requires the ITC to issue a negative 
determination only if: (i) the record as a whole contains a clear and convincing 
evidence that there is no material/threat of injury and (ii) there is no 
likelihood that contrary evidence will arise in the final investigation. In 
addition, the ITC,like the DOC, uses the ‘facts available’ information’ standard.   
When the ITC preliminary and affirmatively concludes that there is a 
reasonable indication of material injury,118 the DOC preliminary determines119 
whether the subject goods are being/likely to being  sold at less than fair 
market value.120 As mentioned,  the DOC is in charge of calculating the 
dumping margin.  
The final injury determination by the ITC is basically a reconsideration of the 
preliminary decision. The same factors considered in the previous 
determination are considered and the dumping margin calculation by the DOC 
is included in the analysis.  
If final injury determination is affirmative as to material/threat injury the ITC 
continues retroactively the suspension of liquidation and the posting of cash 
deposit or other securities previously ordered by the DOC when determined 
that sales where made at less than fair market value.121    
 
V. 2) MAIN FLAWS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE AD LAWS 
Main critics to the administration of AD laws are related to the lack of due 
process in the administrative proceedings and the broad discretionary power 
granted by the Congress to the agencies.  
The AD proceeding has been described as a process with a massive 
discovery request to the respondents consisting of a burdensome production 
of documents with detailed information; where the sole authority of the 
serving party- the DOC- decides the deadline, the extent and the format of the 
requested information; where the serving party is at the same time the judge 
to rule on the adequacy of the response, on the merits of the objections that 
might be raised by the required party and the ultimate decision maker in the 
issue on which the information was requested. Moreover, even when the 
decision maker may hold hearings at the request of the parties prior to final 
                                                 
118 The ITC is not bounded by its previous decisions  
119 The DOC has 160 days within the petition’  filing date. 
120 Steven Thuesen, op. cit, p 11 
121 For a detailed analysis of the administrative proceedings in both agencies, see Steven Thuesen, op.cit, 
pp 2-13. 
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decisions, these hearings are not trial –type hearings subject to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements to adjudicatory hearings. 
Lastly, the serving party has the authority to impose sanctions for failure to 
comply with minor details of questionnaires. 
Few people will affirm that these proceedings are part of the American legal 
system since as they raise concerns of due process: investigative and judicial 
functions are within a single agency. Unfortunately, “this is the inquisitorial 
system that Congress ordained for the administration of AD and countervailing 
duty provisions of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930”.122   
As for the discretionary powers of the agencies, the law vests the DOC and 
ITC with broad discretion and the Judiciary has up-held the use of such a 
discretion up to a great extent.123 Before courts, the agencies’ acts are 
presumed to be valid and not an abuse of the discretionary power. Therefore, 
decisions will only be overturned by the courts if found to be ‘arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of (administrative) discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law’.124 This means that most of the times final decisions 
rest on administrative agencies. 
We will comment on two aspects directly related to the use of discretionary 
powers on behalf of the administrative agencies when enforcing the laws and 
regulations. They are: the facts available standard and the cost of production 
calculation, including dumping margin calculation at the DOC level. 
 
V. 2) a) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE FOREIGN 
COMPANIES. THE FACTS AVAILABLE STANDARD 
A standard questionnaire from the DOC demands information covering all 
sales as well as sales in the company’s home market for a six month period.  
The DOC questionnaires are sent to the primary foreign producers of the 
‘subject merchandise’ (imported products). They are usually comprised of 4 
parts:  Section A seeks information on the company’ corporate structure 
and affiliations, distribution process, sale process, accounting and financial 
practices and the products under investigation generally.  
Section B deals with the company’s sales of ‘such or similar’ merchandise in 
the comparison market. The comparison market is normally the foreign 
producer’s home market125 and the DOC requests information on products 
sold, selling prices, quantities sold, customer class, transportation, 
warehousing expenses, insurances, warranties, rebates and everything related 
                                                 
122 Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws,  p.3, 13 NW. J. Int’l L.& Bus. 491 
(Spring 1993). Available at Lexis Nexis (last visited August 10th, 2003).  
123 Judicial review is available in the Court of International Trade. 
124 Steven Thuesen, op. cit,  p.13 
125 However if the home market is considered not ‘viable’ a third country export market can be assessed 
as the comparison market. 
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to home-market sales.126 The detailed information for each sales transaction 
made during the period of investigation is used to calculate the ‘foreign 
market value’ or normal value “In other words, the benchmark against which 
US prices are compared”.127 
Section C is similar to Section B but is related to sales made in the US. 
However this section includes more information related to transportation and 
selling process. In addition, when the US importer is related to the foreign 
respondent, dumping calculation does not include the prices of the importer 
but on a constructed export price (CEP) based on the price of resale by the 
related importer to the first unaffiliated customer.  
Section D is dedicated to the costs of producing the subject merchandise and 
the foreign such or similar merchandise such as: labor costs, production 
quantities, material costs, overhead, etc. The information must include a 
detailed unit cost element for every product subject to the investigation that 
was sold in both markets.128 
The data must be in a mandatory computer tape format.129 The DOC will only 
accept IBM compatible computer tapes, and “much of what it demands is not 
useful but is demanded to avoid criticism from the petitioner for not being 
thorough enough”.130  The information requested by the DOC can be overly 
burdensome and costly.131 “Companies that refuse to supply information do it 
at their own risk, since the DOC has no qualms about pulling numbers out of 
the air to construct estimated figures if the company does not provide 
them”.132 The average AD questionnaire is seventy pages long, single spaced, 
they are written in English and most of the time pages are to be distributed by 
the requested company within its different divisions– or employees- in order 
to obtain the data to be gathered and sent back to the DOC. In addition, the 
DOC sets tight deadlines and on site investigations of all records by US 
investigators. 
One of the most troublesome aspects in this phase is that refusal to comply 
or the lack of information as required by the DOC is taken as a confession of 
guilt, paving the way for high possible dumping margins.133  
                                                 
126 Brink Lindsey and Dan Ikenson, Antidumping 101. The Devilish Details of “Unfair Trade” Law, p.4, 
CATO institute,  Trade Policy Analysis, No.20, (November26, 2002) 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 The DOC has power to determine what information is enough, when and how it should be presented. 
Appealing these issues are time-consuming, costly and there is a small probability to succeed.  
130 Robert Mc Gee, op. cit. p.3 
131 Matsushita withdrew from an AD case involving small business telephone systems: it was onerous and 
costly. On a Friday afternoon a demand from the Commerce Department to translate and respond 3,000 
pages regarding financial information was due the following Monday morning. Case cited in Robert Mc 
gee, op. cit. p.4 
132 Id, p.4 
133 Id. 
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The WTO – Antidumping Agreement-provides legal support to country 
members dealing with the implementation of AD laws: “in cases in which an 
interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide necessary 
information within a reasonable time or significantly impedes the 
investigation, decisions may be made in the basis of facts available”.134 
Therefore, country authorities are allowed to make determinations based on 
facts contained in the application for the initiation of the investigation by the 
domestic industry.135  
The US has been abusing the WTO legal provisions. Studies estimate 20% 
reduction of the US baseline dumping margin after rules changed following the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement implementation in 1995. However greater 
extensive and intensive use of discretionary practices had already 
compensated for the Uruguay Round effects by the end of 2000. Evidence 
shows that the upward trend in US dumping margins is caused by evolving 
discretionary practices at the DOC – disregarding any significant role for 
country composition of investigated cases or legal changes. The increasingly 
higher dumping margins trend was particularly due to the DOC’s use of 
‘adverse facts available’ standard136 (apart from costs of production test, and 
cost data to construct normal value).137  
As argued by Blonigen, there is strong evidence of systematic changes in the 
DOC discretionary practices – not required by law- and most of them involving 
the use of ‘facts available’ standard. When looking at cases treated in the 
early 80’s and in the late ‘80’s it is clear that at the beginning of the decade 
the DOC was willing to work with respondents during the investigation process 
in order to include their information as ‘facts available’. Nonetheless this is not 
the case in the late 80’s when the agency started to apply the ‘adverse facts 
available’ standard even when companies failed to provide one portion of the 
questionnaire. The DOC unlike in the early 80’s started to disregard any 
information provided for the foreign companies after the preliminary decision 
was reached. 
The impact of discretionary practices in the use of ‘adverse facts available’ 
standard and costs of production tests reflects in the final calculation of 
dumping margins. Calculated dumping margin normally is based on a 
comparison of the export price with either charged in the exporter’s home 
market or its production costs it might appear that one is a justifiable 
provision.  
However, “foreign prices or costs are typically privately-held information of 
the exporter so that foreign firms need some incentive to cooperate in an 
investigation. This incentive in practice has been provided by the potential use 
                                                 
134 Antidumping Agreement (1994) p,154 
135 AD Agreement, Annex II, p.168 
136 See, 19 C.F.R.  §  353.37 (1991)   
137 Bruce Blonigen, Evolving Discretionary Practices of US Antidumping Activity, University of Orengon and 
NBER, p 3  (April 2003).  
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of the domestic firm’s allegations  about foreign firm’s dumping margin. Since 
domestic firm has an obvious incentive to overstate the dumping margin when 
laying out its case, the exporter faces the possibility of very high duties if it 
does not cooperate”.138 
The DOC making use of the ‘facts available’  – usually that provided by the 
petitioners - is able to come up with the numbers it needs, disregarding any 
chance of using information partially submitted by the respondents. 
Even when DOC regulations made it clear that the use of “adverse 
inferences” could be justified if the foreign respondent was perceived as 
deliberately uncooperative, “the ‘facts available’ data is a significant threat”.139 
In other words, the DOC distinguishes between use of ‘facts available’ for 
cooperating firms and ‘adverse facts available’ for non –cooperating firm or 
non-responsive firms.140 In the latter case, the DOC” employs ‘adverse facts 
available’ in the most adverse manner as a punitive measure”.141  
Had not the requested information been complex enough, if foreign firms 
were found by the DOC to be only ‘partially cooperative’ all the information 
provided by the respondents could be thrown out, with facts available used in 
its place.142 
This is a misfortunately frequent DOC’ practice and it has been increasing 
over the last 20 years. The average percentage of cases using “facts available” 
in the first 5 years of the sample is 10.6%, whereas the latter five years’ 
average is 39.6% with the majority of these decisions using ‘adverse facts 
available’. This is to say that by the early 90’s about 40% of the USDOC 
dumping margin decisions were based on information supplied by the 
domestic petitioners!”. 143 
In order to have a general idea of the impact of this practice vis a vis the use 
of information obtained directly form the respondents, data for the period 
between 1995-1998 shows that the average final dumping margin imposed by 
the DOC using facts available standard is 95.58% versus an overall sample 
average of 44.68%. The magnitude of the difference is outstanding. 
The DOC mostly uses information provided by the petitioners which is usually 
biased against foreign producers. “In fact because of the way the Commerce 
                                                 
138 Michael Moore, ‘Facts available’ Dumping Allegations: When will Foreign Firms Cooperate in 
Antidumping Petitions?, Department of Economics and the Elliott School, George Washington University, 
p.2 (April 29th, 2002) 
139 See Moore, op.cit,  for recent cases. 
140 The key change in the use of ‘facts available’ was a policy set by the DOC in the 1987-88 antifriction 
bearing cases against multiple cases. See Bruce A. Blonigen, op.cit.  p. 12  
141 Bruce A. Blonigen, op. cit,. p. 7  
142 Michael Moore, op.cit  p.3  
143Bruce A. Blonigen, op. cit. p. 10  
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Department can construct imaginary prices, it is entirely possible that it can 
find dumping even when prices are the same worldwide”.144 
Defenders of AD laws argue that these laws preserve a ’level playing field’ on 
which domestic and foreign producers can compete based on who makes the 
best product at a lowest cost. However as proved by Lindsey and Ikenson, 
‘dumping is defined in such a way that even perfectly innocent import 
competition is classified as unfair, then the distinction between antidumping 
measures and garden-variety protectionism collapses-and even antidumping 
supporters should admit there is a problem that needs fixing”.145 
In other words, there are “little dirty secrets of antidumping, the 
methodological quirks and biases that results in finding of dumping even when 
the US prices of imported goods are identical to or even greater than the 
prices charged by the foreign producers of those goods in their own home 
markets. Once those quirks and biases are understood, the illusion that the 
AD law in its current form restricts only ‘fair trade’ cannot be sustained”.146  
We will get into the details in the following section. 
 
V. 2) b) CALCULATION OF DUMPING MARGIN   
The most important aspects of the methodology for the calculation of 
dumping margin is the product definition and the determination of the next 
most similar product since the first step in the process is to compare U.S. and 
foreign market prices. Products are defined by the DOC considering specific 
products characteristics and according to the Agency’s determination about 
what is necessary for model matching. This practice adds complications to the 
preparation of sales and costs records in response to the DOC questionnaire. 
It would be easier and more accurate to stand by the respondent’s record-
keeping control. 
Usually the product as defined by the DOC is different from the product as 
defined by the respondent.147 The DOC creates its own product code: ‘Control 
Number’ (CONNUM) which reflects the relevant characteristics of the product. 
Matching across size will occur if there is no match across materials in the 
same size. 
Dumping calculations are determined by comparing adjusted US to adjusted- 
home –market prices and never made on actual sales prices.  
Selling in different markets involves costs and expenses that the DOC assess 
Many of the expenses are deducted from gross selling prices and others are 
used to offset or limit deductions made from gross prices in a particular 
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market.148 For instance, all discounts, rebates,149 and movement expenses,150 
are deducted from gross selling prices in both markets. Selling expenses are 
divided into direct151 and indirect152 selling expenses. Adjustments are made 
for all direct expenses in both markets; however indirect selling expenses are 
given different treatment in both markets: “they are deducted from US prices 
under certain situation – so called constructed export price (CEP) transactions- 
but are not always deducted, at least not entirely, from the prices of the home 
market products”.153  
There is another adjustment regarding the level of trade. It means to 
consider the class of customer to make the proper comparison. If the home 
market customers are retailers or end users and the US customer are 
wholesalers adjustments are to be done since differences prices reflect the 
different nature of the customer’s business. 
Last but not least there are adjustments related to the difference in 
merchandise. “The DOC makes a difference in merchandise (DIFMER) 
adjustment when prices of non-identical products are compared”.154 
Adjustment is calculated as the difference in variable costs of manufacturing 
the distinct products instead of comparing the net US price and the net home-
market price. 
Sales in the US are classified within one of two categories: (i) Export price 
(EP) sales transactions between the exporter and an unaffiliated importer and; 
(ii) constructed export price (CEP) sales are transactions in which the importer 
is affiliated with the exporter, therefore transactions are considered unreliable 
for dumping calculations. In this case the DOC deducts from US prices indirect 
selling expenses and estimated profits on US operations.155 
Once products in both markets are defined by the DOC but before matching 
home market sales to the US sales, the Agency filters out some home market 
sales with 2 tests:  
(i) The arm’s length test: Its goal is to determine whether sales to affiliated 
customers in the home market have been made at prices and on terms 
comparable with those to unaffiliated customers and;  
(ii) The cost test, which purpose is to eliminate sales in the home market at 
prices lower than the full cost of production. This analysis is conducted at the 
CONNUM level. If 80% or more of the sales are made at net prices at or above 
full costs of production, sales passed the cost test and enter into the pool of 
potential matches for the US sales.  
                                                 
148 Id. p.6 
149 Incentives provided by companies to customers to entice early payments or pass along savings. 
150 Costs incurred by the seller to transport merchandise from the factory to the customer. 
151 Expenses made to facilitate specific sales, such as advertising expenses. 
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If no comparable sales are found at arm’s length prices and above costs of 
production, a constructed value (CV) is used as a valid alternative. “CV is an 
estimation of what the product would have sold for it had been sold in the 
home market”.156 CV can be used when home-markets sales still remain but 
none of the eligible home –market CONNUM are considered appropriate 
matches for the US products. 
Once net prices in both markets were calculated and sales failing to pass the 
arm’s length and costs tests were excluded from the home market data base, 
the DOC determines which products to compare – model matching process -. 
Preference is given to identical products. In absence of identical product, the 
next most similar product is sought for comparing prices. In some cases the 
ultimate match may have different characteristics from those of the US 
CONNUM. If the product is similar and the difference in variable costs is no 
more than 20% of the total costs of manufacturing the US product, it will be 
the selected match. If no matches satisfy the DIFMER test, the US product is 
compared with constructed value.157  
Then it is time for dumping margin calculation.  “The dumping margin is 
based on a comparison of the average US net price for each CONNUM during 
the period of investigation with its normal value. Normal value is either the 
average net price of the most similar home market product during the same 
period or in the absence of such or similar product, constructed value”.158  
Normal value is converted into US dollars and is known as foreign unit price 
in dollars (FUPDOL). FUPDOL minus the average US price (USPR) equals the 
unit margin of dumping (UMARGIN). The impact of unit margin is determined 
by the volume of sales of the US product in question (QTYU). The total 
amount of dumping is also referred as the total potentially uncollected 
dumping duties (TOTPUDD) and is the sum of all positive EMARGINs.  
It is important to keep in mind that all price comparisons that account for 
negative dumping margins because FUDPOL was less than USPR are set equal 
to zero. “The practice of disregarding negative dumping margins is known as 
zeroing because the negative dumping amounts are treated as equivalent to 
zero”.159 Finally, the level of dumping is expressed on an ad valorem basis to 
determine an antidumping rate. 
As shown by the Argentine honey case, the administration of the AD law by 
the DOC leaves no room for a successful challenge to the Agency’s practice 
and its own views on behalf of the respondents. Even when regulations allow 
for LOT adjustment it is not always the case. The same comment is valid for 
classifying expenses as direct or indirect and the list goes on.  
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V. 3) DUMPING vs. PRICE DISCRIMINATION.  
The US AD law is concerned with international price discrimination. Even 
when AD supporters argue that AD can take form of price discrimination or 
below cost export sales, from a practical point of view “the AD law does not 
attempt to measure whether subject imports are sold below their costs of 
production. The closest it ever comes is when US prices are compared with 
constructed value – which equals costs of production plus some amount of 
profit. This artificial price is used as surrogate for normal value when 
comparison market prices are unavailable….Most importantly when US prices 
are compared with constructed value what is measured is whether the US 
sales are sold below some designated benchmark of profitability”.160 There is 
no economic rationale – but an arbitrary decision – in establishing 18% 
percentage of profitability in the AD investigations. 
The US law assumes that international price differences are the result of 
underlying market distortions in the home market. Even when that is a 
questionable assumption161 it can be taken for granted in order to raise the 
following question: how well does the AD law measure the international price 
discrimination?.  
The answer is “not well at all. All too often, methodological quirks and biases 
in the US law work to conjure dumping margins out of thin air”.162 Main critics 
on this issue are related to the effect of price fluctuations, the arm’s length 
test, the exclusion of below-cost sales, the use of CV, the model matching 
process, the DIFMER adjustment, the asymmetric treatment of indirect selling 
expenses, the CEP profit and the Zeroing practice.163  
Because AD investigations compare average home-market and US prices 
over a course of a year period, if prices fluctuate during the year then 
differences in sales volumes can generate different annual average prices, 
even if identical prices were charged in both markets. In this cases price 
fluctuations might have nothing to do with unfair trade and still companies 
may be found guilty of dumping due to an imperfect methodology.164 
As for the arm’s- length test – which assumes that affiliated customers may 
receive a more favorable treatment than unaffiliated ones in terms of sales – 
the way it has been applied means the exclusion of home market sales to 
affiliated customers who paid lower prices. However, if affiliated customers 
paid higher prices those sales are not excluded from consideration. The effect 
of excluding the sales to affiliated customers only when prices are lower than 
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sales to unaffiliated customers is a raise in average prices in the comparison 
market; therefore the impact is a raise in dumping margins.165  
The cost-test has been deemed as one of the most egregious methodological 
distortions in the current AD practice.166 Theory behind AD laws is that foreign 
producer enjoys artificial advantage because of a sanctuary market at home. 
Therefore trade barriers and other restrictions on competitions allow artificially 
high  prices in the home market and foreign producers cross subsidize unfairly 
cheap export sales. The purpose of the cost test is to exclude form 
consideration sales made in the home market at prices lower than the full cost 
of production. US sales are then compared only to the highest priced home 
market sales. It has been argued that if price differences between export 
market and home market exist it can not be fairly determined if all the lowest 
home-market prices are excluded from comparison.167   
In addition to a misconceived cost test the situation gets worse if considering 
the way it is applied. “Specifically, individual net prices are compared to 
average annual costs. But if unit costs fluctuates over the period of 
investigation….then the comparison of individual prices to average costs can 
yield perverse results”.168 Empirically the cost test is one of the most relevant 
causes of inflated dumping margins.169   
Constructed value – a cost based approximation of normal value- is 
calculated by adding to the cost of producing the US merchandise an 
estimated amount for home market selling expenses and profit. These 
amounts are estimated on the averages of only those sales that pass the cost 
and the arm’s length tests. Therefore even if a substantial portion of home 
market sales are made at a loss only the expenses and profits of the profitable 
sales are considered to calculate the averages for constructed value. “A 
finding of dumping based on comparing US prices to CV does not show that 
the US sales are below cost; it shows only that they fall below some arbitrary 
benchmark for profitability. Such a finding has no relevance whatsoever to any 
plausible theory of unfair trade”.170 
Moreover, product definition and model matching can be trapped in 
technicalities. The more broadly identical products are defined the greater the 
chance that dumping margins could be generated risking a comparison 
between apples and oranges. However making a product definition specific 
increases the likelihood that dumping margins are a consequence of arbitrary 
distinctions. Hypothetical cases show that in spite of a foreign companies may 
not be engaging in price discrimination, it may be found guilty of dumping. 
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“Random chance and unavoidable arbitrary distinctions can thus play a role in 
determining  the final outcome of a dumping determination. The dumping 
margin reflects not unfair trade, but methodological forthcomings.171 
In addition to indirect selling expenses deduction from the US price in CEP 
situations, the CEP profit deduction (estimated profits in the US selling 
operations) make things worst. These deductions are not corresponded by 
deductions from normal value. This asymmetry increases the dumping 
margins artificially.172 
Last but not least, the zeroing practice becomes the biggest distortion in the 
calculation of dumping margins. “By ignoring ‘negative’ dumping margins (i.e., 
instances in which US prices are higher than home market prices) The DOC 
employs a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ strategy for maximizing dumping 
margins”.173 
It seems that AD laws are not doing a fine job when it comes to distinguish 
fair from unfair trade practices.174 
 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Considering the theoretical and practical problems earlier discussed we 
advocate for the repeal of the AD laws, including the WTO-Antidumping Code.  
That will be our first option. Instead a good – limited safeguard system 
should be implemented. It will deal with imports and domestic industries in an 
effective way, without justifying or disguising unfair trade practices in order to 
implement the protection measures. A good safeguard system might help 
governments to separate trade interventions serving to their national interest 
to those that will not purse that goal. However even when interventions might 
be justified under the national interest objective they should support openness 
and liberalization policies. Efficient safeguard procedures would consider not 
only those benefiting from them but also the losers due to the imposition of 
import restrictions. Legal standing and economic analysis related to the 
‘losers’ of import restrictions should be included in the administrative 
procedures. Last but not least, import restrictions should be limited in time 
and discretionary powers to manipulate the deadlines should be avoided.175 
Our second best - option will be a modification to the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement176 aimed at limiting the discretionary practices of the AD 
                                                 
171 Id. p.17 
172 Id. 21 
173 In 17 out of 18 DOC cases examined by Lindsey and Ikenson, zeroing was the most significant cause 
of dumping margins.  
174 Many AD laws worldwide follow the US model – therefore these critics are applicable. 
175 See Finger, op cit for details and guidelines proposed regarding a better safeguard mechanism. 
176 We think the language of the Trade Promotion Authority granted by the Congress to the Executive 
Power regarding the AD laws and enforcement is not a legal obstacle for discussing and negotiating the 
proposed modifications. 
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authorities in the country members. In other words, setting out tight 
guidelines for filing a case, for dumping margin calculations, including review 
of costs of production for both petitioners and respondents – to minimize 
‘strategic’ –political – motivation for AD filings as well as to prevent rent- 
seeking, will be a first step in the right direction. 
The third and importantly alternative will be a statutory amendment of the 
US AD law. Modifications should include the administrative proceedings before 
the ITA/DOC since investigated parties lack of an impartial tribunal and the 
Agency is pretty vulnerable to political pressure.177  
As it has rightly been pointed out, the fact that ITA almost never absolves a 
respondent on dumping allegations does not prove itself a bias but plants 
serious doubts about the agency’s impartiality when enforcing the AD laws.178  
The criticism comes not only from the practitioners or scholars but from the 
United States Court of International Trade (CIT) as well. In overruling an ITA 
decision and ordering the agency to reimburse penalties to a Japanese ball-
bearing manufacturer, Judge Nicholas Tsoucalas stated that the DOC 
repeatedly ignored and disobeyed decisions of the CIT. In another, case 
regarding the ITA’s propensity to take advantage of every minor failure by the 
respondents to comply with the voluminous and detailed questionnaires, 
Judge Musgrave stated that ITA’s “predatory ‘gotcha’ policy does not promote 
cooperation or accuracy”.179  
Specifically, we agree with the proposal of submitting the AD proceedings to 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and adding Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJ) to rule in the proceedings.180 The main benefits from that proposal are: 
(i) AD charges will be decided by a different authority (AJL) than the one 
running the AD investigation (DOC) reducing or eliminating the perception of 
partiality; (ii) the issues involved in an AD investigation will appropriately be 
considered in a trial-type hearing by an ALJ; (iii) it will solve the surprise 
changes in methodology, in differential treatment to the parties (unlike the 
DOC’s officials AJL are insulated form informal contacts by parties or their 
attorneys) and; (iv) it will -in the long run -  reduce the number of appeals.181 
In addition, we propose rule modifications in order to make a distinction 
regarding the type and characteristics of the respondents. The US AD law 
provides no distinction between the size and type of foreign industries under 
investigation neither consider the nationality of the company to identify if the 
respondent is from a developing country.  
                                                 
177 Michael A. Lawrence, Bias in the International Trade Administration: The Need for Impartial Decision 
Makers in the United States Antidumping Proceedings, p.1, 26 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 1, Winter 1994. 
Available in Lexis Nexis (Last visited August 15th, 2003)   
178 Id. p.2 
179 Id 
180 The proposal is detailed in Michael A. Lawrence in the op.cit,  However, the idea had been proposed by 
Professors Jackson and Davey in 1991 (Administrative Conference). 
181 Supra note 175, p.7 
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The same burdensome, detailed 300 average response to the questionnaires 
is demanded by the DOC to a multinational corporation and to a small - family 
agricultural-business, as we discussed in the Honey case. Just to set a pretty 
obvious example of  inappropriate demands from the DOC let us remind you 
that for many companies in the agricultural sector coming from developing 
countries tax income is not a fiscal obligation and that rural producers - if do  - 
keep their records of cash income and expenses they do  on pieces of papers.  
However the DOC applies the General Accepted Accounting Procedures (GAAP) 
to them disregarding any specific situation on behalf of the respondents or 
their domestic laws.. In other words, “ The American AD laws  does not make 
any distinction about how big you are, your level of development, or your type 
of industry. It has one questionnaire, one set of rules, and very little flexibility 
for developing countries”.182 
Last but not least, the use of facts available standard in the proceedings 
should be modified as well. It is contrary to a rule-based system to disregard 
an entire piece of information – over an average 300 pages in response- just 
because the respondent failed to comply with minor aspects of the 
questionnaires, many times due to non-existent information or practice in the 
respondent’s home country.  
We are fully aware of the political impact of these proposals and that it might 
sound unrealistic in the near future. A great deal of political will and courage is 
a pre-requisite to start the process but the challenge is worth; benefits to the 
overall international trade system will outweigh the costs.  
From a political - international - point of view we are confident that they will 
contribute to shape a coherent free-trade policy while at the same time 
significant improvements to the North / Developed –  South /Developing 
countries’  dialogue can be expected.  
 
VII CONCLUSION 
The lack of significant progress on international trade negotiations is to be 
placed within the complex current economic context. Even when there are 
some signs of a turnaround in the US, Europe seems to loose momentum, 
Japan is not doing as well as expected and the Chinese economy continues to 
bustle along but some concerns are still over SARS consequences. As for Latin 
America, there is confidence in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico-; nonetheless 
economic recession in Venezuela and political difficulties in the Andean 
countries ‘weigh down regional performance’.183 Moreover, low commodity 
prices get Africa into trouble. To sum up, “Today’s growth is far short of the 
                                                 
182 Leslie Glick, Symposium: Comments on the Administration of US Unfair Trade Practice Law: Missed 
Opportunities in NAFTA, 1 US-Mex. L. J. 185, p. 2 (1993) Available in Lexis Nexis (last visited August 15th, 
2003) 
183 World Bank 2003, Global Economic Prospect 2004, p.xiii, available at: http://www.worldbank.org (last 
visited September 30th, 2003)  Hereinafter GEP04 
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pace necessary to make significant dents in the poverty headcount to achieve 
the Millennium  
The Doha Round and its promise for development are at stake so far. Unless 
trade barriers in the agricultural sector are slashed substantial reduction in 
global poverty will not be achieved.184 The explanation is pretty 
straightforward: most of the world’s poor work in agriculture, 70% of the 
world’s poor live in rural areas and earn their income from agriculture and 
most of the world’s protection is aimed at agriculture which is among the most 
distorted sectors in international trade. “Reducing protection in agriculture 
alone would produce roughly two-thirds of the gains from full global 
liberalization of all merchandise trade185…  
Rich countries account for two-thirds of world trade and comprise nearly 
three quarters of world GDP, so their domestic policies – most evident in 
agriculture- have the greatest effect on the global marketplace. Subsidies in 
the OECD countries account for US$ 330 billion, of which some US$250 billion 
goes directly to producers. The effect is to stimulate overproduction in high 
cost rich countries and shut out potentially more competitive products from 
poor countries. The net effect of subsidizing the relatively rich in wealthy 
countries at the expense of adverse price penalties for the products of the 
relatively poor in developing countries is to aggravate global income 
inequalities. In other words, ‘subsidies make the relatively rich richer and the 
poor even poorer’.186 
Even if Cancun is considered as a setback - not a failure - of the Doha 
Round, there is no doubt it was a lost opportunity for developed countries to 
seriously committing themselves to internal farm reforms and providing 
developing countries with valuable trade offs for its own commitments. 
Agriculture, AD law and its abuse, non farm trade, access to patented drugs, 
special and differential treatment are vital issues to the developing world. 
Provided significant progress is made on those trade areas, no important 
advance should be expected on investment, competition, trade facilitation and 
government procurement187 as required by the developed countries in the 
scope of the multilateral trade system.  
There is sufficient cross – country evidence that trade liberalization and 
openness to trade increases the growth rate of income and output. Moreover 
some studies suggest that ‘trade does seem to create, even sustain higher 
                                                 
184 Other crucial issues to development outcomes are: labor-intensive manufactures; services; trade 
facilitation, and special treatment for developing countries.  
185 Keep in mind that protection facing developing country exporters in agriculture is 4 to 7 times higher 
than in manufactures in the North and 2 to 3 times higher in developing countries. For details see, GEP, 
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growth’.188 Last but not least, there is a relevant link between trade, growth 
and the poor.   
The link of overall growth to poverty alleviation has been demonstrated in 
cross-country analysis and in individual countries as well.189 ‘Trade 
liberalization can be expected to help the poor overall given the positive 
association between openness and growth’.190 
Moreover, many developing countries have already made sound market – 
oriented reforms –  assuming high social costs as it is the case of Argentina - 
in order to substantially encourage foreign investment and reduce trade 
barriers.191  
However, in most of the economy sectors where developing countries are 
highly competitive – namely agriculture192 -  they face strong lobbies and 
biased AD law enforcement on behalf of the developed countries. The US 
Argentina Honey case  is a valid example.  
Argentine honey producers as in many other parts of the world make their 
living –or survive – on honey production. As mentioned before the Argentine 
Honey Industry is composed mainly by small not - related producers, 
scattered around the country. The industry has internationally been 
acknowledged as leading in the world markets since it is cost competitive, 
produces good quality and markets very well.  
AD duties imposed by the U.S. hit mainly small producers – less than 500 
beehives- driving them out of the American market just to protect the 
domestic – already protected – industry.  
It seems that when developing countries sell  low - priced products they 
dump but when it is the case of developed countries they are efficient and 
competitive. 
It is time for  developed countries to take the leadership and move forward 
on the international trade agenda. As it has correctly been pointed out: 
“Despite the fact that protection, tariff peaks and antidumping measures 
shield powerful lobbies, rich country leadership in reducing this protection is a 
prerequisite for a pro-poor development outcome”.193  
It would be greatly beneficial if developed countries take the lead and repeal 
the WTO Anti Dumping Code as well as its own AD laws. If that is not possible 
                                                 
188 Bernard Hoekman, Constantin Michalopoulos, Maurice Schiff and David Tarr, Trade Policy, p.2, 
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sound modification of the current AD laws and their implementation to prevent 
abuses might be the first step in the right direction.  
We are completely aware of the great amount of political will governments 
will have to invest in order to get reforms negotiated and implemented. 
Strong opposition from sectors benefiting from protective laws and policies will 
lobby against reforms; however those sectors traditionally harmed by 
protective measures such as consumers and import - related business will 
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